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FIGHTING THE WAR ON TERRORISM 
WITH THE LEGAL SYSTEM: 
I. INTRODUCTION 
A DEFENSE OF MILITARY 
COMMISSIONS 
JESSICA ERIN TANNENBAUM • 
On November 8, 2004, Judge James Robertson of the United States Dis-
trict Court for the District of Columbia entered an order halting the trial 
of Salim Ahmed Hamdan before a military commission, ordering that the 
trial may not be continued until a "competent tribunal" determines that 
Mr. Hamdan is not entitled to the protections accorded prisoners of war 
under the Geneva Conventions. 1 This was but the latest installment in a 
saga that has garnered much attention since the attacks on September 11, 
2001, but actually traces its genesis to events that took place in central 
Asia in the 1970's. Mr. Hamdan is a Yemeni citizen and former driver 
for Osama bin Laden, who was captured in Afghanistan and detained as 
an enemy combatant at the United States military base at Guantanamo 
Bay, Cuba. 2 His case is but one example of an issue that has been at the 
forefront of the American psyche since 9/11: how to balance our national 
security interests with the interests of international law and human rights. 
During the course of the War on Terrorism, many issues involving the 
United States' approach to international law and human rights have 
* Jessica Erin Tannenbaum is a student at Notre Dame Law School. She would like to thank 
Professor Jimmy Gurule for his invaluable assistance with this paper. 
I. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 344 F. Supp. 2d 152, 173 (D.D.C. 2004). 
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arisen. Among these have been allegations of torture both in Iraq and in 
Guantanamo Bay, accusations that the United States illegally invaded 
and occupied Iraq, charges that the American govemment illegally assas-
sinated al Qaeda members in Yemen and claims that the United States 
violates the rights of foreign visitors with harsh immigration rules. But 
perhaps of most interest to the legal community is the Bush administra-
tion's decision to re-institute the use of military commissions for those 
accused of terrorism. Citing the acts of terrorism against the United 
States, the national security interests and the probability of future attacks, 
President Bush issued a military order requiring trial by military com-
mission for accused international terrorists, which, although not uncom-
mon throughout history, had not been used by the United States for dec-
ades. 3 
In early 2002, the United States began transporting prisoners captured in 
Afghanistan to the naval base at Guantanamo Bay. Almost immediately, 
an uproar broke out over the detention of prisoners there. The United 
States was, and continues to be, almost universally criticized by the in-
ternational community for its handling of the prisoners at Guantanamo 
Bay. The most common criticisms are of the detention of accused terror-
ists without charges and the indefinite detention of non-citizens certified 
as dangers to national security as authorized by the USA PATRIOT 
Act. 4,5 Although all of the issues regarding the detention of prisoners in 
the War on Terrorism are interesting and significant to the legal commu-
nity, this paper will be limited in scope to the planned use of military 
commissions to try accused terrorists. The military commissions, devel-
oped in accordance with the Military Order of November 13,2001, com-
port fully with both international and American law and provide the best 
method to meet the security needs of the United States while prosecuting 
those who commit or plan to commit terrorist acts against this country. 
There are many advantages to the use of military commissions, not the 
least of which are the assured secrecy of the proceedings, a higher con-
viction rate, the possibility of a death penalty and the use of trials as an 
extension of the military campaign. Furthermore, those al Qaeda mem-
bers detained for acts of terrorism do not even qualify for prisoner-of-
war status under the Geneva Conventions and thus the protections do not 
3. Anton L. Janik, Jr., Prosecuting AI Qaeda: America's Human Rights Policy Interests are 
Best Served by Trying Terrorists Under International Tribunals, 30 DENV. J. INT'L. L. and POL'y 
498, 507 (2002). 
4. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept 
and Obstruct Terrorism Act of2001, 107 H.R. 3162 (2001) [hereinafter PATRIOT Act]. 
5. See Sean D. Murphy, Contemporary Practice o/the United States Relating to International 
Law, 96 AM. J. INT'L.L. 461, 472 (2002). 
2
Annual Survey of International & Comparative Law, Vol. 11 [2005], Iss. 1, Art. 5
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/annlsurvey/vol11/iss1/5
2005] A DEFENSE OF MILITARY COMMISSIONS 81 
apply to them. Arguments that the military commissions do not comport 
with the standards of international law fail, as al Qaeda operatives and 
other terrorists are not entitled to the protection of the Geneva Conven-
tions and the military commissions do meet the requirements of the In-
ternational Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Arguments that the 
military commissions are unconstitutional are equally without merit, as 
the military commissions have been established in full accordance with 
American law. 
This paper will first discuss the history leading up to the detention of al 
Qaeda and Taliban members at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. Then, the his-
torical development of military tribunals, the arguments for and against 
the current plan to try accused terrorists before military commissions, 
and relevant portions of American and international law will be dis-
cussed, ultimately showing that the trial of accused terrorists by military 
commission is supported by the interests of national security as well as 
by international law and the Constitution. 
II. EVENTS LEADING TO THE DETENTION OF SUSPECTED 
TERRORISTS AT GUANTANAMO BAY 
A. THE RISE OF THE T ALIBAN IN AFGHANISTAN 
In 1973, Afghanistan became a republic under the leadership of President 
Sardar Mohammed Daud. Daud turned to the Soviet Union for help in 
putting down an Islamic fundamentalist movement. The Soviets gave 
him over $2.5 billion in military and economic aid, but he failed to build 
institutions or establish a strong central government. 6 In 1978, Marxist 
sympathizers in the Afghan army supported by the Soviet Union over-
threw the Afghan government, massacring Daud and his family. How-
ever, the Marxists began to fight among themselves, and shortly after the 
coup many rural tribal groups began to revolt against them. The country 
quickly deteriorated into a civil war, which would eventually claim 1.5 
million Afghani lives over 11 years. The United States supported the 
Afghanis, who were seen as anti-Soviet troops fighting against a Com-
6. Jaime Jackson, Trial of the Accused Taliban and Al Queda Operatives Captured in Af-
ghanistan and Detained on a u.s. Military Base in Cuba, 34 CUMB. L. REv. 195, 199 (2004) (cita-
tions omitted). 
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munist attempt to destroy an age-old culture and religion. 7 The Soviet 
troops were eventually expelled in 1989.8 
The Taliban gained control of Afghanistan in 1996. The Taliban was 
formed out of the Mujahideen, who had fought against the Soviets. A 
Mujahideen fighter named Mullah Mohammed Omar Mujahed started 
the Taliban movement when he became disgusted by fighting among the 
Mujahideen leaders and the Taliban gained widely held support among 
the Mujahideen, eventually gaining control over the majority of Afghani-
stan with the exception of certain northern areas where rebel forces re-
mained active. 9 
The Taliban had a dictatorial and highly centralized structure controlled 
largely by Mullah Omar. The main governing body was the Supreme 
Shura, also known as the Kandahar Shura, which consisted of ten mem-
bers appointed by Mullah Omar.1O The Taliban regime was basically 
unopposed by Afghanis or other nations until 2001. II 
After the 9111 attacks, the United States Congress passed a resolution 
empowering President George W. Bush to "use all necessary and appro-
priate force against those nations, organizations or persons he determines 
planned, authorized, committed or aided the terrorist attacks that oc-
curred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or per-
sons ... "12 The investigation of the 9/ 11 attacks quickly focused on 
Osama bin Laden, who was believed to be harbored by the Taliban re-
gime in Afghanistan. 13 On September 20,2001, President Bush spoke to 
the Congress. During his speech, he demanded that the Taliban tum over 
to the United States all al Qaeda leaders, terrorists and terrorist support-
ers, close every terrorist training camp in Afghanistan and allow the 
United States full access to terrorist training camps. After Taliban offi-
7. [d., citing Ahmed Rashid, TALIBAN: MILITANT ISLAM, OIL, AND FUNDAMENTALISM IN 
CENTRAL ASIA 12 (2001). 
8. Manooher Mofidi and Amy Eckert, "Unlawfol Combatants" or "Prisoners of War"; The 
Law and Politics of Labels, 36 CORNELL INT'L L.1. 59, 83 (2003) (citing KAMAL MATINUDDIN, THE 
TALIBAN PHENOMENON: AFGHANISTAN 1994-19975 (1999». 
9. [d. 
10. Jackson, supra note 6, at 200. 
II. [d. at 201. (citing Rashid, supra note 7, at 102-04.) Jackson suggests that the lack of 
opposition to the Taliban regime implies that the Taliban was in fact the legitimate government of 
Afghanistan, which will be important later in discussing the legal status of Taliban detainees. See 
Thorn Shanker and Katharine Q. Seelye, Who is a Prisoner of War? You Could Look It Up, Maybe., 
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 10,2002, at AI. 
12. Authorization for Use of Military Force, S.J. Res. 23, 107th Congo (2001) (emphasis 
added}. 
13. Mofidi and Eckert, supra note 8, at 77. 
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cials refused, American and British forces invaded Afghanistan on Octo-
ber 7,2001. 14 
B. THE FORMATION AND STRUCTURE OF AL QAEDA 
Al Qaeda was set in motion in 1982 when 100,000 Islamic militants, 
backed by the United States and Britain, traveled from 43 Islamic states 
to fight against the Soviets in Afghanistan. Among these fighters was 
Osama bin Laden, who became head of the network in 1989 and gave it 
its name, which means 'the military base.'15 At the head of al Qaeda is 
the emir, a position held by bin Laden.16 Beneath the emir sits a council 
called the shura, which consists of about 12 advisers to bin Laden. 
Within al Qaeda, there are two types of operatives: the first group is in 
charge of intelligence, surveillance and bomb making and the second, 
expendable type carries out the attacks. The al Qaeda network is made 
up of numerous cells located worldwide and funded by bin Laden. Al 
Qaeda acts as an umbrella group, sending operatives and funds to support 
terrorist acts carried out against 'infidels' by its cells worldwide. l ? 
After the 9111 attacks, the United States declared that these attacks were 
an act of war and that it was engaged in an international armed conflict. 18 
However, rather than declaring war against another state, the United 
States declared a war on terrorism and, in particular, against al Qaeda 
worldwide. 19 The invasion of Afghanistan met with quick success, and 
by late November, 2001, the Northern Alliance forces supported by the 
United States had gained control of Afghanistan.2o With this success 
came the capture of many Taliban and al Qaeda accused of supporting 
terrorism. Initially, these prisoners were detained near Mazar-e-Sharif in 
Afghanistan.21 In January, 2002, the United States began transporting 
these prisoners to the United States Naval Base at Guantanarno Bay, 
Cuba. 22 
14. Id at 78. 
15. Id. 
16. Jackson, supra note 6, at 202. 
17. Id. 
18. Marco Sassoii, Use and Abuse of the Laws of War in the "War on Terrorism", 22 LAW 
ANDINEQ.1. 195,197 (2004). 
19. Id Of course, the United States has engaged in war against other states in connection to 
the war on terrorism, specifically Afghanistan and Iraq. 
20. Mofidi and Eckert, supra note 8, at 78-79. 
21. Id. at 79. 
22. Jackson, supra note 6, at 195. 
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C. THE UNITED STATES AT GUANTANAMO BAY 
The United States has leased the naval base at Guantanamo Bay since 
American forces occupied Cuba in 1903. Cuba agreed that the United 
States would exercise "complete jurisdiction and control over and 
within" the naval base at Guantanamo Bay.23 In return, the United States 
recognized the ultimate sovereignty of Cuba over that area. However, 
"ultimate" in this context meant final or eventual, meaning that Cuban 
sovereignty would be interrupted until the United States terminated its 
occupancy of Guantanamo Bay. The United States and Cuba solidified 
this agreement in the Treaty of 1934, which gave the United States a 
perpetual lease on the naval base, which is voidable only if the United 
States abandons the area or by mutual agreement between the two na-
tions.24 
III. THE HISTORY AND LEGALITY OF MILITARY TRIBUNALS 
On November 13, 2001, President Bush issued the Military Order Re-
garding Detention, Treatment and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the 
War Against Terrorism.25 President Bush is authorized to issue such 
military orders by his authority as Commander-in-Chief of the armed 
forces as well as by Articles 21 and 36 of the Uniform Code of Military 
Justice.26 Although this modem usage of military commissions has met 
with much controversy and criticism, in fact military tribunals are noth-
ing new and, throughout history, have been essentially considered the 
entitlement of the victorious power. In order to understand the justifica-
tion for the planned use of military commissions to try those accused of 
terrorism against the United States, it is first necessary to understand the 
historical and international context of military tribunals over the past 25 
centuries. 
A. INTERNATIONAL HISTORY OF MILITARY TRIBUNALS 
Traditionally, a military tribunal, or commission, is a wartime judicial 
proceeding used to try violations of the laws of war.27 Internationally, 
military tribunals have been used for at least 2500 years.28 Although his-
torically the reason that military tribunals came into being was that this 
23. !d. at 197 (citations omitted). 
24. [d. at 198 (citations omitted). 
25. Military Order Regarding Detention, Treatment and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the 
War Against Terrorism [hereinafter "Military Order"], 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833 § I (e) (Nov. 13,2001). 
26. Jamik, supra note 3, at 508 (citing U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2; 10 U.S.C. 821 (2001); 10 
U.S.C. 836 (2001». 
27. [d. at 499. 
28. [d. at 500. 
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was the only means to conduct a trial proceeding, in the modem age of 
national court systems the main attraction has been that military tribunals 
offer the ability to bring the leaders of foreign adversaries to justice. 
Also, military tribunals generally allow for the application of the death 
penalty. 29 
The first known use of military tribunals occurred in ancient Greece 
when Lacedaemonian military leaders met briefly to discuss the fate of 
captured Athenian troops, who were summarily executed. The modem 
form of military tribunals was first seen in the Middle Ages, when trials 
were actually held. In 1474, Sir Peter of Hagenbach was tried for war 
crimes. He argued that he had only followed orders, but this defense was 
rejected and he was sentenced to die. 30 A more famous example is the 
trial of Napoleon Bonaparte. After his return from exile in Elba, Napo-
leon was again captured. Under the provisions of the Congress of Vi-
enna's Declaration of 1815, Napoleon had been declared an outlaw and 
subject to any actions that the allied European powers deemed appropri-
ate. Napoleon was handed over to the British, who tried him and sen-
tenced him to exile at St. Helena. This famous case set the precedent for 
military tribunals' ability to try an adversary's supreme leader. 31 
In the Twentieth Century, the bloodiest century in history with its many 
wars, military tribunals, particularly international ones, gained popular-
ity. The Treaty of Versailles, signed at the end of World War I in 1919, 
established a special international tribunal comprised of judges from the 
United States, Great Britain, France, Italy and Japan to try Kaiser 
. Wilhelm II of Germany for offense "against international morality and 
the sanctity of treaties. "32 Other treaties signed after World War I pro-
vided for tribunals to try Austrian, Bulgarian, Hungarian and Turkish 
leaders. The Allied powers requested that 896 Germans be handed over 
for trial before such tribunals. However, diplomatic concerns caused the 
Allies to abandon the Treaty of Versailles requirement that the Germans 
surrender their accused citizens for trial. 33 
After World War II, international military tribunals were again used to 
try those responsible for war crimes and crimes against humanity. The 
1945 Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War 
Criminals of the European Axis, signed by the United States, Britain, the 
29. [d. at 501. 
30. [d. (citations omitted). 
31. [d. 
32. [d. at 502 (citing Treaty of Versailles, June 28,1919, art. 227, 2 Bevans 43). 
33. [d. 
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Soviet Union and France, provided for what became known as the Nur-
emberg Trials. These trials set the precedent for the international trial 
and punishment of war criminals.34 Nearly a year later, the first trial 
concluded when 12 defendants, including Hitler's second-in-command 
Herman Goering, were sentenced to die and executed. Similar trials 
were conducted for Japanese citizens accused of war crimes, and 24 of 
25 defendants were convicted, including Japanese Prime Minister Gen-
eral Hideki Tojo, who was executed.35 The 1945 Agreement also pro-
vided for domestic tribunals, which were used in the United States and 
will be discussed infra. 
It would be nearly 50 years before tribunals were again used in the inter-
national context, although in their most recent form these international 
tribunals have been governed by the United Nations rather than a mili-
tary body. The International Court of Justice, the main judicial body of 
the United Nations, has no jurisdiction over individuals; however, the 
United Nations has on a case-to-case basis created tribunals to hear cases 
against individuals accused of war crimes. In 1993, the Security Council 
established the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugosla-
via to try individuals accused of genocide and crimes against humanity. 
This tribunal is still ongoing. Following the precedent set by the trials of 
Napoleon and Hideki Tojo, the United Nations has brought to trial for-
mer Yugoslavian President Slobodan Milosevic, who stands accused of 
genocide and crimes against humanity. Unlike prior trials of those ac-
cused of war crimes and the current military tribunals in the United 
States, those tried under the auspices of the United Nations will not face 
the death penalty. In 1994, the Security Council again formed an inter-
national tribunal to try those accused of genocide, this time in the Rwan-
dan genocide. In contrast with the current tribunal system instituted in 
the United States with President Bush's military order, the Yugoslavian 
and Rwandan tribunals were limited in that they only dealt with specific 
crimes committed during a specific crime period. 36 
Another international tribunal under the auspices of the United Nations 
was set up in July 1998 with the passage of the Rome Statute of the In-
ternational Criminal Court, which entered into force after being ratified 
by 60 nations on April 11, 2002.37 The International Criminal Court 
[hereinafter ICC] can exercise its jurisdiction over individuals accused of 
34. Id. (citations omitted). 
35. Id. at 503. 
36. Id. 
37. Id. at 505. For current ratification data by country, see < 
http://www.iccnow.orgJindex.php?mod=romesignatures>. 
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certain crimes specified in its charter 38 and only when national courts are 
unable or unwilling to investigate or prosecute those crimes. 39 Because 
of these limitations, the United States would not be able to avail itself of 
the ICC to try accused terrorists; furthermore, although President Clinton 
signed the Rome Statute shortly before leaving office, the United States 
Senate has not ratified it. 40 Therefore, the ICC is not a possible option 
for the trial of those accused of acts of terrorism against the United 
States. 
B. AMERICAN USE OF MILITARY TRIBUNALS 
Military tribunals are created by the President pursuant to his Article II 
powers as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces and under Article 
21 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice. 41 The first American use of 
a military tribunal occurred in 1780, when British Army Major John An-
dre was convicted as a spy before a tribunal called the 'Board of General 
Officers.' The first official military tribunals were set up during the war 
between the United States and Mexico, where American soldiers accused 
of violations of the laws of war were tried by military tribunals. A mili-
tary tribunal was also used to try those accused in the conspiracy to as-
sassinate President Lincoln in 1865.42 
The most famous use of a military tribunal is the case of Ex Parte 
Quirin, the rules of which still apply today. 43 The petitioners in Quirin 
were eight German citizens who entered the United States for the pur-
pose of committing espionage and sabotage and were arrested by federal 
agents and charged with violations of the laws of war. President Roose-
velt ordered that the prisoners be tried by military tribunals. The peti-
tioners challenged this order, claiming a right to a jury trial under Article 
III, Section 2 and the Fifth and Sixth Amendments. The Court found 
that, under the Articles of War, offenses against the laws of war could be 
tried by a military tribunal. 44 The Court also found that Article III and 
the Fifth and Sixth Amendments do not require that a jury be made 
38. Id. These crimes include genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and "aggression". 
Importantly, terrorism is not included on this list. 
39. Id. 
40. See < http://www.iccnow.orglindex.php?mod=romesignatures>. 
41. Janik, supra note 3, at 499. See also U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2; 10 U.S.C.S. 821 (2004). For 
a more in-depth discussion of the constitutional process by which the Executive may create military 
tribunals, see Ex Parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1,26-28 (1942). 
42. Janik, supra note 3, at 506. 
43. Id. 
44. Ex Parte Quirin, 317 U.S. at 28. 
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available at a military tribunal or that offenses against the laws of war be 
tried in the civilian courtS.45 
The plan articulated in the Military Order developed following the events 
of September 11, 2001. The PATRIOT Act became law on October 26, 
2001. The PATRIOT Act requires the detention of any non-citizen 
whom the Attorney General has certified as having reasonable grounds to 
believe is a terrorist, a participant in terrorist activity or is engaged in any 
other activity that endangers the national security of the United States. 46 
Detainees may be held for up to seven days without charges, after which 
removal proceedings must be initiated or charges must be filed. How-
ever, the Attorney General may continue to detain non-citizens certified 
as a danger to national security even after removal proceedings have 
been initiated. Furthermore, any non-citizen whose removal is unlikely 
in the near future may be detained for up to six months if the Attorney 
General finds that releasing that person will threaten national security. 47 
The PATRIOT Act requires that the Attorney General review the de-
tainee's certification every six months48 and allows detainees to seek 
review in habeas corpus proceedings in the Article III courts. 49 
The Military Order also provides for the detention of individuals subject 
to the Order. Individuals subject to the Military Order include: any non-
citizen who is a current or former member of al Qaeda; anyone who has 
engaged in, aided or abetted or conspired to commit acts of international 
terrorism, or acts in preparation therefor, that have caused, threaten to 
cause or have as their aim to cause injury to or adverse effects on the 
United States, its citizens, national security, foreign policy or economy; 
or anyone who has knowingly harbored one or more such individuals. 50 
Any individual determined by the President to be subject to the order 
shall be detained at a location designated by the Secretary of Defense. 51 
52 
45. Id. at 40. 
46. 107 H.R. 3162 §§ 236A(a)(l)-(4). 
47. Id. at §§ 236A(a)(S)-(6). 
48. Id. at § 236A(a)(7). 
49. Id. at §§ 236A(b)(I)-(2). Critics of the PATRIOT Act complain that this allows a single 
person, the Attorney General, to detain non-citizens indefInitely on mere suspicion of involvement in 
terrorism. See, e.g., 96 A.J.I.L. at 472. 
SO. 66 Fed. Reg. S7,833 at §§ 2(a)(I)(i-iii). 
SI. Jd. at § 3(a). The Order also provides that detainees shall be treated humanely; afforded 
food, water, shelter, clothing, and medical care; and allowed the free exercise of religion to an extent 
consistent with the conditions of detention. See id. at § § 3(b )-( d). 
52. The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of such detentions in Hamdi v. Rums/eld, 
542 U.S. S07, 124 s. Ct. 2633, IS9 L. Ed. 2d 578 (2004), even if the detainee is a United States 
citizens captured in a combat zone. See also 344 F. Supp. 2d at 173. Hamdi is an American citizen 
10
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President Bush's Military Order of November 13, 2001, mandates that 
such detainees be tried before military commissions rather than interna-
tional tribunals or Article III courts. The Military Order is implemented 
by the Department of Defense. 53 The creation of military tribunals is 
within the Executive's power as discussed supra, and the Supreme Court 
has upheld the constitutionality of such tribunals on not one but two oc-
casions. 54 
The Military Commissions function as follows: first, the President must 
determine that an individual is subject to the Military Order. Until this 
determination is made, the Military Commission will not have jurisdic-
tion over any individual. Once an individual is determined to be subject 
to the military order, the Appointing Authority55 may decide to bring 
criminal charges against him upon the recommendation of the Chief 
Prosecutor. The Appointing Authority also appoints the members of the 
Military Commission panel who will hear the case. Each panel consists 
of no less than three and no more than seven officers in the United States 
Armed Forces and is headed by a Presiding Officer, who must be a Judge 
Advocate General. The panel must reach a two-thirds majority to reach a 
guilty verdict and impose a sentence, with the exception of a death sen-
tence, which may only be imposed upon unanimous agreement. 56 
Defendants before the Military Commissions are assured of many proce-
dural safeguards. First, the proceeding is generally required to be full 
and fair. Defendants are presumed innocent until proven guilty beyond a 
reasonable doubt. They have the right to call and cross-examine wit-
nesses. Although the attorney-client privilege does not apply in the same 
manner in which it applies in proceedings before Article III courts, noth-
ing said by a defendant to his attorney, nor anything derived therefrom, 
may be used against him. No negative inference will be made should a 
defendant choose to remain silent. Military Defense Counsel is provided 
free-of-charge to all defendants, or the defendant may hire an attorney of 
his own choosing provided that the attorney is a citizen of the United 
who challenged his detention on the grounds that 18 U.S.C. § 4001(a) forbids the detention of citi-
zens by the United States except pursuant to act of Congress. The Court held that the Authorization 
for Use of Military Force, SJ. REs. 23, 107'" Congo (2001), is an act of Congress authorizing such 
detentions. The Court has also held that the right to petition for a writ of habeas corpus, is available 
to all detainees regardless of citizenship pursuant to U.S. CONST. art I, § 9, cl. 2 and 28 U.S.C. § 
2241. See Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 124 S. Ct. 2686, 159 L. Ed. 2d 548 (2004). 
53. The Department of Defense has done so through a series of Military Commission Orders 
and Instructions. See generally <http://www.defenselink.millnews/commissions.html>. 
54. See In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. I (\946); Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. I (1942). 
55. The' Appointing Authority' is designated by the Secretary of Defense to issue orders 
establishing and regulating military commissions. 
56. See Department of Defense Fact Sheet on Military Commission Procedures, available at 
<http://www.defenselink.millnews/ Aug2003/d20030812factsheet.pdt>. 
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States who is admitted to practice in a jurisdiction of the United States, 
has not been the subject of disciplinary action, obtains a Secret level 
clearance and agrees to follow the rules of the military commission. 
Furthermore, after the panel has reached a verdict and imposed a sen-
tence, the trial record must be reviewed by the Appointing Authority, a 
three-member Review Panel of military officers, one of which must have 
prior experience as a judge, and the Secretary of Defense. The President 
has the final decision authority over the case, which he may delegate to 
the Secretary of Defense. The President or Secretary of Defense may 
change a guilty verdict to a guilty verdict on a lesser-included offense or 
otherwise mitigate, commute or defer the sentence but may not change a 
not guilty verdict to a verdict of guilty. 57 
C. AN OVERVIEW OF THE BENEFITS OF TRYING ACCUSED TERRORISTS 
BEFORE MILITARY COMMISSIONS 
Any non-citizen who is a current or former member of al Qaeda, anyone 
who has engaged in, aided or abetted or conspired to commit acts of in-
ternational terrorism, or acts in preparation therefor, that have caused, 
threaten to cause or have as their aim to cause injury to or adverse effects 
on the United States, its citizens, national security, foreign policy or 
economy, or anyone who has knowingly harbored one or more such in-
dividuals is subject to the Military Order of November 13, 2001. 58 In the 
Military Order, President Bush cited "the danger to the safety of the 
United States and the nature of international terrorism;"59 "[t]he ability of 
the United States to protect the United States and its citizens, and to help 
its allies and other cooperating nations protect their nations and their 
citizens, from such further terrorist attacks depends in significant part 
upon using the United States Armed Forces to identify terrorists and 
those who support them, to disrupt their activities, and to eliminate their 
ability to conduct or support such attacks;"60 and that "[t]o protect the 
United States and its citizens, and for the effective conduct of military 
operations and prevention of terrorist attacks, it is necessary for indi-
viduals subject to this order pursuant... to be tried for violations of the 
laws of war and other applicable laws by military tribunals."61 These 
three findings of fact echo the most compelling and commonly used ar-
guments in favor of military commissions and of the Military Order in 
particular. 
57. [d. 
58. 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833 at §§ 2(a)(I)(i-iii). 
59. [d. at § let). 
60. [d. at § I (d). 
61. [d. at § lee). 
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A first and very pressing argument in support of the use of military 
commissions is the argument that military commissions allow the gov-
ernment to protect sensitive information that would have to be publicly 
disclosed if the case were heard before an Article III court. Second, 
many argue that ordinary trials would expose all those involved in the 
judicial system, including court staff, judges, attorneys and jurors to the 
threat of retaliation by terrorists, a threat which the civilian judicial sys-
tem is not equipped to handle. Third, military commissions operate with 
more flexible rules of evidence than civilian courts. The rules of evi-
dence used in military commissions allow the introduction of all relevant 
evidence. 62 In his Military Order, President Bush stated that 'it is not 
practicable to apply in military commissions under this order the princi-
ples of law and the rules of evidence generally recognized in the trial of 
criminal cases in the United States district COurtS.'63 Other rights not 
accorded prisoners detained under the Military Order include the right to 
counsel during interrogation and the requirement of a unanimous ver-
dict. 64 These standards likely will lead to a higher conviction rate than a 
trial before an international tribunal or Article III court would attain. 65 
Another argument in favor of military commissions is that the commis-
sions are an extension of the United States' military campaigns in the 
War on Terrorism. This argument is supported by Section l(d) of the 
Military Order, quoted supra. Proponents of this argument see the mili-
tary commissions as an exercise of the United States' right as a sovereign 
nation to capture and bring to trial terrorists who have killed or plan to 
kill American citizens or otherwise attack or injure the United States. 
They further argue that even though the use of military commissions may 
bring international criticism, the United States risks greater damage if 
accused terrorists are able to take advantage of the more liberal rules and 
privileges accorded to defendants in Article III courts. 66 
A final argument in support of military commissions is that military 
commissions often impose the death penalty. Although a death penalty 
is available in trials before Article III courts, it is not available in interna-
62. Viet D. Dinh, Foreword: Freedom and Security after September 11, 25 HARv. J. L. & PUB. 
POL'y 399, 405 (2002). 
63. 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833 at § I(t). 
64 . Janik, supra note 3, at 531. 
65. Id. at 529. After World War I, only six of 45 Gennans accused of war crimes were eventu-
ally convicted when tried before a German domestic court. Dissatisfied, the Allies decided to con-
duct the trials before domestic military tribunals pursuant to Articles 228-230 of the Treaty of Ver-
sailles. The military tribunals, which used standards similar to those allowed by the Military Order 
of November 13, 2001, had an 85 percent conviction rate. See ROBERT K. WOETZEL, THE 
NUREMBERG TRIALS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1962). 
66. Id. at 530. 
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tional commissions under the auspices of the United Nations, including 
the ICC, due to the United Nations' stance that the death penalty is viola-
tive of human rights. 67 Historically, the death penalty was used in inter-
national military commissions, however an international military tribunal 
is not a likely option for those arrested in the War on Terrorism because 
no foreign nations have been specifically targeted in this war. 68 A major-
ity of Americans continue to support a death penalty as a sentencing op-
tion, and President Bush specifically stated that a death penalty would be 
a sentencing option for those tried pursuant to the Military Order. 69 
D. ARGUMENTS AGAINST TRIAL BY MILITARY COMMISSIONS 
Arguments opposing the use of military commissions also abound. Such 
arguments generally take one of two distinct forms: the plan spelled out 
in the Military Order tramples upon the Constitution and civil liberties, 
or it violates international law and human rights. A third argument, 
which combines the first two yet makes a distinctly different point, is 
that the plan elucidated in the Military Order, while it may not techni-
cally violate international law, does disregard international norms and 
also weakens civil liberties, which has the effect of worsening, rather 
than raising, national security. The first two arguments must generally 
be addressed together as the questions of the applicability of international 
law generally intermingle with Constitutional questions regarding the 
powers of the President to order military commissions and United 
States' obligations under international treaties. 
1. Background 
Since September 11, many Americans have felt that they have to chose 
between their civil liberties and national defense or security, that the two 
cannot coexist. This impression is nothing new; in fact, as early as 1759, 
Benjamin Franklin stated that 'they that can give up essential liberty to 
obtain a little temporary safety deserve neither liberty nor safety. '70 
However, for Abraham Lincoln, who is considered by many to be the 
strongest protector of liberty in American history, liberty was not always 
67. See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. III, G.A. Res. 2l7A(III), available at 
<http://www.un.orgiOverview/rights.html>. Although the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
does not specifically prohibit the imposition of a death penalty and many U.N. member states con-
tinue to impose capital punishment, the provision that 'everyone has the right to life' has been used 
to justify a refusal to allow the imposition of a death penalty in international tribunals under the 
auspices of the U.N. 
68. Janik, supra note 3, at 529. This is in contrast with the two World Wars, both of which 
resulted in international military tribunals that did impose capital punishment as discussed supra. 
69. 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833 at § 4(a). 
70. Dinh, supra note 62, at 399, citing BENJAMIN FRANKLIN, HISTORICAL REVIEW OF 
PENNSYLVANIA (1759) (citations omitted). 
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the ultimate good- in 1861, President Lincoln unilaterally suspended the 
writ of habeas corpus, stating, 'Are all the laws, but one, to go unexe-
cuted, and the government itself go to pieces, lest that one be violated?' 
To Lincoln, liberty could be a threat to the government's very exis-
tence. 71 However, many Americans have criticized the Military Order 
and the PATRIOT Act as violative of civil liberties. 
The Supreme Court has unanimously upheld the constitutionality of mili-
tary tribunals 72 and recent cases have shown no indication that the Court 
will change its mind. However, recent litigation shows that the constitu-
tionality claims are not without merit. In order to understand the issues 
raised in recent cases, one must first have a cursory understanding of the 
Geneva Conventions. 
The Geneva Conventions are the codification of the international regula-
tions governing the treatment of prisoners and other persons during 
armed conflict. There are four Geneva Conventions, which were con-
cluded in 1949: the Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Con-
dition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field; the Ge-
neva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, 
Sick, and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea; the Geneva 
Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War; and the Ge-
neva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time 
of War. 73 The debate over the status of the detainees at Guantanamo Bay 
centers on the Third Convention. The United States is a High Contract-
ing Party to the Conventions, which were ratified by the Senate on Au-
gust 2, 1955.74 The Third Convention applies to all High Contracting 
Parties, regardless of whether the party has actually declared a state of 
war. Parties must abide by the Convention even when involved in a con-
flict with a state that is not a party to the Convention. 75 The Geneva 
71. Id. at 399-400, citing Abraham Lincoln, Message to Congress in Special Session (July 4, 
1861) (citations omitted). 
72. See Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. I (1942); see also In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1 (1946). 
73. Heather Anne Maddox, Comment, After the Dust Settles: Military Tribunal Justice for 
Te"orists after September 11. 2001, 28 N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 421, 443 (2003). These Con-
ventions are commonly known as the First, Second, Third and Fourth Geneva Conventions, respec-
tively. 
74. See <http://www.icrc.org/eng/party_gc>. There were two Protocols to the Geneva Con-
vention adopted in 1977, which the United States did not ratify. 
75. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, Part I, 
Art. 2, 6 U.S.T. 3316 [hereinafter Third Geneva Convention], available at 
<http://www.ohchr.org/english/law/prisonerwar.htm> . 
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Convention is the law of the United States pursuant to the Supremacy 
Clause. 76 
2. Presidential Authority to Establish Military Commissions and the 
Applicability of the Third Geneva Convention 
The most recent case to gamer attention is Hamdan V. Rumsfeld.77 Mr. 
Hamdan, like many other detainees, was captured in Afghanistan in 2001 
and transferred to Guantanamo Bay in 2002. The President, finding that 
there was reason to believe that Mr. Hamdan and five other enemy com-
batants were al Qaeda members or otherwise involved in terrorism, de-
termined that those six detainees were subject to the Military Order, 
thereby setting the stage for the first trials by military commission. In 
February 2004, Mr. Hamdan filed a demand for charges to be filed and a 
speedy trial pursuant to Article 10 of the Uniform Code of Military Jus-
tice,78 but the Appointing Authority determined that the UCMJ did not 
apply to him. Pursuant to a recent Supreme Court decision holding that 
federal district courts have jurisdiction over habeas corpus petitions filed 
by Guantanamo Bay detainees,79 Mr. Hamdan filed a petition for man-
damus or habeas corpus in April 2004. 80 Charges were formally filed 
against Mr. Hamdan by the Military Commission on July 9, 2004. 
On November 8, 2004, the district court ordered that Mr. Hamdan may 
not be tried by Military Commission for the offenses with which he is 
charged. The court found that the President did not properly have the 
authority to determine that Mr. Hamdan was subject to trial by military 
commission, even though a Congressional resolution had given him that 
authority. Stating that Article II does not confer upon the President the 
authority to establish military tribunals, the court found that the authority 
to establish military tribunals was instead found in the Articles of War, 
which were the predecessor to the UCMJ. 81 The court went on to state: 
"Quirin and Yamashita make it clear that Article 21 [of the UCMJp2 
76. u.s. CONST. art. VI, Cl. 2, which states: "all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under 
the authority of the United States, shall be Supreme Law of the land ... " 
77. 344 F. Supp 152. 
78. 10 U.S.C.S. § 810 (2004) [hereinafter UCMJ]. 
79. See Rasul, 124 S. Ct. 2686 (holding that United States courts have jurisdiction to consider 
challenges to the legality of the detention of foreign nationals captured abroad in connection with 
hostilities and incarcerated at Guantanamo Bay and that the district courts have jurisdiction to hear 
the petitioners' habeas corpus challenges under 28 U.S.C. § 2241). 
80. Mr. Hamdan initially filed his petition in the United States District Court for the District of 
Washington, but his case was transferred on July 8, 2004, to the District Court for the District of 
Columbia when the Ninth Circuit held in Gherebi v. Bush, 374 F.3d 727 (2004), that all such cases 
should be heard in that court. 
81. 344 F. Supp. 2d at 158. 
82. 10 U.S.C.S. § 821. 
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represents Congressional approval of the historical, traditional, non-
statutory military commission. The language of that approval, however, 
does not extend past 'offenders or offenses that by statute or by the law 
of war may be tried by military commissions ... "'83 The court went on to 
reason that the Geneva Conventions are part of the laws of war, and that 
the trial of Mr. Hamdan before a military commission did not comport 
with the Geneva Conventions because the Geneva Conventions require 
that prisoners of war be tried by courts-martial, and therefore the trial 
before a military commission does not comport with the laws of war or, 
by extension, the Constitution. 
The district court's reasoning is fundamentally flawed. The court relies 
on Quirin, which sustained the President's order creating a military 
commission, explaining that "by his Order creating the ... Commission 
[the President] has undertaken to exercise the authority conferred upon 
him by Congress and also such authority as the Constitution itself gives 
the Commander in Chief, to direct the performance of those functions 
which may constitutionally be performed by the military arm of the na-
tion in time of war."84 However, the Quirin Court found it unnecessary 
"to determine to what extent the President as Commander-in-Chief has 
constitutional power to create military commissions without the support 
of Congressional legislation .. ."85 The district court goes on to state that 
the Supreme Court has never made such a determination, and then de-
termines that Article II does not confer upon the President the authority 
to create military commissions. 
The district court ignores the language of the Supreme Court's decision 
in Madsen v. Kinsella, which states: 
In the absence of attempts by Congress to limit the President's 
power, it appears that, as Commander-in-Chief of the Army and 
Navy of the United States, he may, in time of war, establish and 
prescribe the jurisdiction and procedure of military commissions, 
and of tribunals in the nature of such commissions, in territory 
occupied by Armed Forces of the United States. His authority to 
do this sometimes survives cessation of hostilities. The Presi-
dent has the urgent and infinite responsibility not only of com-
83. 344 F. Supp. 2d at 159. 
84. 317 U.S. at II. 
85. /d. 
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bating the enemy but of governing any territory occupied by the 
United States by force of arms. 86 
The district court's conclusion that Article II does not confer upon the 
President the authority to establish military tribunals directly contradicts 
the Supreme Court's interpretation of Article II in Madsen. 
However, the court does seem to assume that Article 21 of the UCMJ 
constitutes an 'attempt by Congress to limit the President's power' of the 
sort mentioned in Madsen. 
Article 21 states, in its entirety: 
The provisions of this chapter conferring jurisdiction upon 
courts-martial do not deprive military commissions, provost 
courts, or other military tribunals of concurrent jurisdiction with 
respect to offenders or offenses that by statute or by the law of 
war may be tried by military commissions, provost courts, or 
other military tribunals. 87 
It is difficult to see where in this brief paragraph the district court found 
support for the conclusion that the President overstepped his authority in 
issuing his Military Order. 
It is established that military commissions are constitutional and that the 
procedures by which they are governed are established not by statute but 
by the common-law tradition. 88 The court, according prisoner-of-war 
status to Mr. Hamdan,89 determines that the trial of Mr. Hamdan before a 
military commission would violate the Geneva Convention, which is 
recognized as a law of war. 90 However, assuming arguendo that Mr. 
Hamdan should be designated as a prisoner-of-war under the Geneva 
Conventions, the court's analysis is still flawed. The Third Geneva Con-
vention applies in "all cases of declared war or of any other armed con-
flict which may arise between two or more of the High Contracting Par-
ties ... ,,91 The district court assumes that this describes the situation of 
86. 343 u.s. 341, 348 (1952). 
87. 10 u.s.c.s. § 821. 
88. See Madsen, 343 U.S. at 346-347 (1952); Yamashita, 327 U.S. at 18-23. 
89. The court's decision that Mr. Hamdan qualifies for the protections of the Geneva Conven-
tion is flawed, as will be discussed infra. 
90. See Military Commission Instruction No.2, 32 C.F.R. § 11.5(g) (Apr. 30, 2003) available 
at <http://www.defenselink.millnewslMay2003/dZ0030430milcominstn02.pdf>. Interestingly, the 
district court did not address the issue of whether Mr. Hamdan has standing to challenge the execu-
tive's violation of the Geneva Conventions, an issue which is also outside the scope of this paper. 
91. 6 U.S.T. 3316, Part I, art. 2. 
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Mr. Hamdan's capture. However, this is not clear at all. Mr. Hamdan is 
a Yemeni national who was a member of an international terrorist or-
ganization, al Qaeda. He was captured in a war not against any state or 
party to the Geneva Convention, but against global terrorism. The Third 
Geneva Convention states: 
Although one of the Powers in conflict may not be a party to the present 
Convention, the Powers who are parties thereto shall remain bound by it 
in their mutual relations. They shall furthermore be bound by the Con-
vention in relation to the said Power, if the latter accepts and applies the 
provisions thereof. 92 
The Convention makes no reference to non-state actors or international 
groups. Rather, the text specifically refers to 'Powers' in conflict, a term 
generally understood to refer to sovereign states. It stands to reason, 
based upon the text of the Convention, that the Third Geneva Convention 
does not apply to those who fight on behalf of al Qaeda or similar terror-
ist organizations. Furthermore, acts of terrorism committed by groups 
such as al Qaeda are not traditionally regarded as creating an armed con-
flict and therefore are outside the scope of international humanitarian law 
and the Geneva Conventions.93 The British campaign against the Irish 
Republican Army (IRA) and the Spanish campaign against Euskadi ta 
Askatasuna (ETA) have not been treated as armed conflicts.94 Therefore, 
it follows that the American campaign against al Qaeda, to the extent that 
the United States does not become involved in armed conflict with an-
other state, is also outside the scope of the Geneva Convention.95 
3. Evidentiary Proceedings 
A second procedure that the district court found illegal is detailed in the 
provisions of the Military Commission Order on procedure allowing for 
limited disclosure of evidence or witnesses on security grounds. These 
provisions allow for the protection of classified or other protected infor-
mation; information that may abridge the physical safety of participants 
in the proceeding, including witnesses; information that may impact the 
confidentiality of law enforcement or intelligence sources and methods; 
and information that implicates national security interests. 96 Detailed 
92. Id. 
93. Sassoli, supra notel8, at 202, citing LESLIE C. GREEN, THE CONTEMPORARY LAW OF 
ARMED CONFLICT 53-54 (I.M. Sinclair et al. ed., 1993). 
94. Id. 
95. See also Mofidi and Eckert, supra note 8, at 74 ("Private citizens, including terrorists, have 
no claim to the benefits of protection guaranteed soldiers under Geneva Convention Ill.") 
96. Military Commission Order No. I, 32 C.F.R. § 9.6(d) (Mar. 21, 2002), available at 
<http://www .defenselink.miVnewslMar2002/d2002032I ord.pdf>. 
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military defense counsel may not be excluded from any proceedings, nor 
may the commission hear evidence that has not been presented to de-
tailed defense counsel. 97 The district court found that this is violative of 
the Confrontation Clause 98 as well as "international humanitarian and 
human rights law."99 However, the court declined to enter into analysis 
of whether Mr. Hamdan was entitled to the protections of the Confronta-
tion Clause, instead finding that this provision violates the UCMJ. 
The district court relied on Articles 36 and 39 of the UCMJ, which state, 
respectively: 
Pretrial, trial, and post-trial procedures, including modes of 
proof, for cases arising under this chapter triable in courts-
martial, military commissions and other military tribunals, and 
procedures for courts of inquiry, may be prescribed by the Presi-
dent by regulations which shall, so far as he considers practica-
ble, apply the principles of law and the rules of evidence gener-
ally recognized in the trial of criminal cases in the United States 
district courts, but which may not be contrary to or inconsistent 
with this chapter. 100 
When the members of a court-martial deliberate or vote, only the 
members may be present. All other proceedings, including any 
other consultation of the members of the court with counselor 
the military judge, shall be made a part of the record and shall be 
in the presence of the accused, the defense counsel, the trial 
counsel, and, in cases in which a military judge has been detailed 
to the court, the military judge. 101 
The district court concluded that the text of these Articles proscribes any 
procedure or mode of proof that is inconsistent with the UCMJ, implying 
that military commissions must be conducted with exactly the same evi-
dentiary procedures as those required for courts-martial. 102 This conclu-
sion is flawed for a number of reasons. Congress has expressly author-
ized the President to promulgate the procedures governing military 
commissions in Article 36. Since military commissions are mentioned in 
only nine of the 158 articles of the UCMJ, a literal reading of Article 36 
shows that it requires only that those procedures not be inconsistent with 
97. [d. 
98. u.s. CONST. amend. VI. 




UCMJ Article 36, 10 U.S.C.S. § 836(a). 
UCMJ Article 39(b), 10 U.S.C.S. § 839(b). 
344 F. Supp. 2 at 169. 
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the UCMJ Articles which actually deal with military commissions, not 
with each article. If every article of the UCMJ were intended to govern 
military commissions, the specific provisions for military commissions 
in nine of those articles would be redundant. \03 Furthermore, the Su-
preme Court held in Yamashita that a military commission did not have 
to adhere to the procedural directives of courts-martial. 104 The Court so 
held despite language in Article 38 of the Articles of War equivalent to 
that of Article 36 of the UCMJ. \05 However, the district court found that 
Yamashita is not governing authority. The Yamashita court determined 
that the guarantee of trial by courts-martial in the 1929 Geneva Conven-
tion did not apply to Mr. Yamashita because it interpreted that guarantee 
as applying only to trials for crimes committed while the defendant was a 
prisoner of war. The Third Geneva Convention, adopted after Yamashita 
and ratified by the United States, makes it clear that this guarantee also 
applies to crimes committed while the defendant was a combatant, nulli-
fying the Supreme Court's finding to the contrary. \06 The district court's 
finding, however, assumes that Mr. Hamdan is entitled to the protections 
ofthe Geneva Conventions. 
One need not look farther than the text of the Third Geneva Convention 
to determine that Mr. Hamdan is not entitled to their protections, both 
because the conflict with al Qaeda does not fall under the Geneva Con-
ventions as discussed supra and because Mr. Hamdan is not a prisoner-
of-war as defined by the Geneva Conventions. 
4. Who is a Prisoner of War? 
The Third Geneva Convention defines prisoners of war as: 
... persons belonging to one ofthe following categories, who have 
fallen into the power of the enemy: 
1. Members of the armed forces of a Party to the conflict 
as well as members of militias or volunteer corps form-
ing part of such armed forces. 
103. David Glazier, Note, Kangaroo Court or Competent Tribunal?: Judging the 21" Century 
Military Commission, 89 VA. L. REv. 2005, 2020-2021 (2003). Glazier points to the general princi-
ple of statutory interpretation that courts should pay heed to every word of a statute, citing NORMAN 
J. SINGER, 2A STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION~ 46.06 (6th ed. 2000). 
104. See 327 U.S. 1. 
105. Glazier, supra note 103, at 2021. 
106. 344 F. Supp. 2d at 170. 
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2. Members of other militias and members of other vol-
unteer corps, including those of organized resistance 
movements, belonging to a Party to the conflict and op-
erating in or outside their own territory, even if this terri-
tory is occupied, provided that such militias or volunteer 
corps, including such organized resistance movements, 
fulfil the following conditions: 
(a) That of being commanded by a person re-
sponsible for his subordinates; 
(b) That of having a fixed distinctive sign recog-
nizable at a distance; 
(c) That of carrying arms openly; 
(d) That of conducting their operations in accor-
dance with the laws and customs of war. 
3. Members of regular armed forces who profess alle-
giance to a government or an authority not recognized by 
the Detaining Power. 107 
When doubt exists as to the status of a detainee, the detainee must be 
treated as a prisoner of war until his status is determined by a competent 
tribunal. 108 However, in the case of al Qaeda members, the United States 
has maintained that there is no doubt and therefore no need for such a 
determination to be made. 109 The district court in Hamdan found that 
doubt does exist and ordered that a competent tribunal must determine 
whether Mr. Hamdan should be accorded prisoner-of-war status. 110 
It is evident that detained al Qaeda members are not Prisoners of War as 
defined by the Convention. Al Qaeda is not a party to armed conflict 
within the meaning of the Geneva Conventions, as discussed supra, be-
cause it is not a state but an international terrorist group outside the scope 
of international humanitarian law. Detainees from 'other militias' or 
'volunteer groups,' into the definition of which al Qaeda may fit, must 
meet the criteria articulated in section two of Article 4, Paragraph A, 
107. 6 U.S.T. 3316 part I, art. 4, para. A. 
108. Id at art. 5, para. 2. 
109. See, e.g., Testimony of Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld, Senate Armed Services 
Committee (Feb 5, 2002), available at <http://www.defenselink.miVspeeches/2002/s20020205-
secdef4.htm1>. 
110. 344F. Supp. 2dat 173-174. 
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quoted supra. Al Qaeda members do not meet these criteria. First, al 
Qaeda fighters are not commanded by a person responsible for his sub-
ordinates. Rather, it is a loosely structured organization made up of nu-
merous cells, sending operatives and funds to support acts of terrorism. III 
Second, al Qaeda has no distinctive or recognizable sign.112 Al Qaeda 
members do not generally carry arms openly, rather they resort to suicide 
bombings and other clandestine forms of attack. 
Most significantly, perhaps, al Qaeda does not conduct its operations in 
accordance with the laws and customs of war. Al Qaeda, as a non-state 
actor, is not bound by any of the international treaties which make up the 
laws of war; however, al Qaeda does engage in acts that would plainly 
violate the laws of war. The Geneva Conventions require that civilians 
"shall in all circumstances be treated humanely, without any adverse 
distinction founded on race, colour, religion or faith, sex, birth or wealth, 
or any other similar criteria."113 Al Qaeda deliberately targets civilians, 
with the aim of killing "infidels,"114 a distinction plainly based on relig-
ion. The Geneva Conventions also forbid the taking of hostages,115 a 
tactic in which al Qaeda has repeatedly engaged, and generally require 
that attacks avoid civilian and non-military targets whenever possible. 116 
Even though al Qaeda is not bound by the Conventions, attacks on civil-
ian targets in the manner they are committed by al Qaeda clearly violate 
the customs of war. Al Qaeda operatives are not members of regular 
armed forces professing allegiance to any other government or authority. 
Based on these facts, no doubt can remain that al Qaeda operatives are 
not prisoners of war and therefore are not eligible for the protections of 
the Third Geneva Convention. 
Combatants fighting on behalf of the Taliban, by contrast, do qualify for 
prisoner-of-war status as defined by the Geneva Conventions. The Tali-
ban regime was basically unopposed by Afghanis or other nations until 
2001. This lack of opposition to the Taliban regime implies that the 
Taliban was the legitimate government of Afghanistan. 117 Afghanistan, 
as a sovereign state, is a "Power in conflict" within the meaning of the 
Third Geneva Convention and therefore the United States must abide by 
the Convention with respect to any conflict with Afghanistan. 118 There-
III. Jackson, supra note 6, at 202. 
112. Janik, supra note 3, at 513. 
113. Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 
12,1949,6 U.S.T. 3516 part I, art. 3, para. I; 6 U.S.T. 3316 part I, art. 3, para. I. 
114. Jackson, supra note 6, at 202. 
115. See, e.g., 6 U.S.T. 3516 part 1II, art. 34; 6 U.S.T. 3316 part I, art. 3, para. I (b). 
116. See Mofidi and Eckert, supra note 8, at 74. 
117. Jackson, supra note 6, at 201. 
118. 6 U.S.T. 3316, part I, art. 2. 
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fore, Taliban soldiers were members of the armed forces of a party to the 
conflict in Afghanistan and are entitled to the protections afforded pris-
oners-of-war. The United States has acknowledged that Taliban combat-
ants have prisoner-of-war status. 119 
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights sets out the 
requirements for fairness of any tribunal. 120 These include the require-
ments that a tribunal must ensure a "fair and public hearing by a compe-
tent, independent and impartial tribunal established by law;" provide the 
defendant with the presumption of innocence; inform the defendant of 
the nature of the charge against him; allow the defendant to be repre-
sented by counsel of his choosing; be able to face his accuser; have the 
right to remain silent; and have the right to appeal. The Covenant allows 
that "[t]he press and the public may be excluded from all or part of a trial 
for reasons of morals, public order ... or national security in a democratic 
society." 121 As outlined supra, the military commissions ordered in 
President Bush's Military Order meet these criteria. 
5. Other Considerations 
A final argument against the use of military tribunals is that the plan elu-
cidated in the Military Order, while it may not technically violate inter-
national law, does disregard international law and also weakens civil 
liberties, which has the effect of worsening, rather than raising, national 
security. Proponents of this argument suggest that Americans have 
traded liberty for supposed security and that the United States has acted 
with a disregard for international norms, which will cause harm to the 
United States in the long run. 
American Civil Liberties Union President, Nadine Strossen, stated that 
President Bush weakened constitutional protections when he "bypasse[d] 
Congress and the people by issuing executive orders that essentially vio-
late separation of powers and the checks and balances system we have in 
this country."122 However, this argument neglects the fact that the Su-
preme Court has found that Congress did authorize President Bush to 
"use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organiza-
tions, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided 
119. K. Elizabeth Dahlstrom, Humanitarian Law: The Executive Policy Toward Detention and 
Trial of Foreign Citizens at Guantanamo Bay, 21 BERKELEY J. 1NT'L L. 662 (2003). 
120. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, U.N. GAOR, 21 st Sess., Supp. No. 16 
at 52, art. 14 (1966). The United States ratified this Convention in 1992. See 
<http://www.unhchr.ch/pdf/report.pdf>. 
121. !d. 
122. Janik, supra note 3, at 523. 
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the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored 
such organizations or persons ... "123 The Supreme Court has held that this 
authorization covers the Military Order of November 13,2001. 124 Others 
have made arguments regarding the infringements on civil liberties made 
by various provisions of the PATRIOT Act. Although these arguments 
may be persuasive, they are outside the scope of this paper. 
Another argument in favor of prosecuting the detainees before an inter-
national tribunal is that this would preserve the United States' stance on 
human rights. Proponents of this argument hold that it would be difficult 
for the United States to encourage other states to follow international 
humanitarian law in its treatment of prisoners if the United States tries 
detainees before international tribunals. 125 This argument would hold 
water if the military commissions did in fact violate international hu-
manitarian law. However, the military commissions do not violate inter-
national law. Al Qaeda operatives and other terrorists tried before mili-
tary commissions are not prisoners of war as defined by the Geneva 
Conventions. Taliban detainees are prisoners of war and the United 
States has stated that it will abide by the Geneva Conventions with re-
spect to their treatment. The military commissions do satisfy the re-
quirements for tribunals set forth in the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights. Furthermore, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld has 
stated that the United States will treat all detainees in "a manner that is 
reasonably consistent with the Geneva Conventions ... " regardless of the 
fact that they are not entitled to prisoner-of-war status. 126 Given that the 
United States is comporting fully with international humanitarian law, 
the military commissions will not weaken the United States' stance on 
human rights. 
A third argument is that there is low international support for the military 
commissions. Proponents of this argument maintain that establishing an 
international tribunal under the auspices of the United Nations to try ac-
cused terrorists would improve the United States' reputation in the inter-
national community and preserve good relations with American allies. 
However, the security interests of the United States make an interna-
tional tribunal implausible. It would be difficult to preserve the secrecy 
of classified information in a trial before an international body including 
non-American citizens. Furthermore, military tribunals have generally 
been seen as an extension of the military campaign, and the military 
123. S.J. Res. 23, 107th Congo 
124. See Hamdi V. Rums/eld, 124 S. Ct. 2633 
125. See, e.g., Janik, supra note 3, at 526; Jackson, supra note 6, at 229. 
126. Janik, supra note 3, at 512 (citations omitted). 
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commissions for accused terrorists subject to the Military Order are no 
different. 127 Prosecuting terrorists under the auspices of the United Na-
tions would be a departure from this view and would represent a weaken-
ing of the concept that a sovereign state has the right to capture and try 
those who engage in armed attacks against its citizens. 128 
A final argument often made opposing the military commissions is the 
argument that the United States' treatment of non-citizen detainees may 
affect the treatment of American citizens detained abroad. This argu-
ment suggests that the United States, which has protested the use of mili-
tary tribunals in other countries, will have less leverage in assisting 
Americans convicted by military tribunals. However, the United States' 
criticism has generally been limited to tribunal procedures that would 
constitute a violation of the fundamental fairness required by the Interna-
tional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 129 Furthermore, the na-
tional security interests necessitating the use of military commissions -
the needs to preserve the confidentiality of classified information, avoid 
risk to civilians, and allow more flexible rules of evidence - seem to out-
weigh the national interest in helping citizens who have been convicted 
before foreign tribunals. The interests of thwarting terrorism and avoid-
ing future attacks are simply more urgent. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
As of November 2004, about 580 prisoners continued to be detained at 
Guantanamo Bay. 130 The trial of these prisoners before military com-
missions was set in motion with the first determination by the President, 
on July 3, 2003, that six of these detainees were subject to the Military 
Order of November 13,2001, allowing the first military commissions to 
commence. 131 However, this process was halted by the United States 
District Court for the District of Columbia's order in Hamdan V. Rums-
feld on November 8, 2004. The district court found that the use of mili-
tary commissions as commanded by the Military Order violated both the 
Constitution and international law.132 However, an analysis of the mili-
tary commissions shows that they comport with relevant international 
127. 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833 at § I(d) 
128. See Laura Ingraham, Military Tribunals Provide Streamlined Justice, USA TODAY, Nov. 
26,2001, p. 15A. 
129. For example, the United States has criticized the use of military tribunals in Russia, Egypt, 
China, Peru and Columbia. See 30 Janik, supra note 3, at 528. 
130. Neil A. Lewis, Disagreement Over Detainees' Legal Rights Simmers, N.Y. DMES, Nov. I, 
2004, at AI. 
131. United States Department of Defense Press Release (July 3, 2003) 
<http://www.defenselink.mil/releasesI2003/nr20030703-0173.html>. 
132. 344 F. Supp. 2d 152. 
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law and that the President was acting fully within his authority both as 
Commander-in-Chief and pursuant to the Authorization for the Use of 
Military Force when he issued the Military Order. 
It remains to be seen whether Hamdan will be overruled, allowing the 
military commissions to go forward. However, in order to thwart terror-
ism, the United States must be permitted to act in the interests of national 
security, exercising its right as a sovereign state to capture and prosecute 
those who attack its citizens. Despite international and domestic criti-
cism, the use of military commissions is supported by both international 
law and the interests of national security and they remain a crucial 'front' 
in fighting the War on Terrorism. 
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